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I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 31, 2013, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit ruled that New York Southern District Judge Shira 
Scheindlin lacked the requisite impartiality to rule on the high profile civil 
rights case Floyd v. City of New York.1  The panel concluded that Judge 
Scheindlin’s impartiality could reasonably be questioned under 28 U.S.C. § 
1. See 538 F. App’x 101 (2d Cir. 2013) (analyzing Judge Shira Scheindlin’s bias,
or the potential appearance of bias, under 28 U.S.C. § 455). 
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455 and vacated her August 12 ruling against the City of New York.2  Two 
years earlier, the Northern District of California examined Judge Vaughn 
Walker’s impartiality in another high profile civil rights case, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger.3  The Northern District of California concluded, however, 
that Judge Walker’s impartiality could not be questioned under § 455, the 
same statute analyzed by the Second Circuit in Floyd.4 
This Comment argues that the Perry court applied the appropriate 
standard required by § 455(a) and properly declined to speculate as to 
Judge Walker’s bias, while the Second Circuit erred in Floyd by applying a 
lower standard for disqualification and gave too much weight to 
characterizations of Judge Scheindlin in the media.5 Part II of this 
Comment reviews the language of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), the case law 
interpreting the statute, and the procedural history of Perry and Floyd.6  
Part III argues that the Second Circuit should not have disqualified Judge 
Scheindlin because she did not make statements to the media that discussed 
the merits of the Floyd case, nor did her statements in a related case, 
Daniels, warrant an exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine.7  Part IV 
offers policy arguments to amend the vague language of § 455, which 
would allow for a more uniform application of the statute across the federal 
system.8  Part V concludes that the vagueness of the statutory language 
may have contributed to its misapplication in Floyd.9 
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012) (noting that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate
judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned”). 
3. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(assessing the defendant-intervenors’ motion to disqualify trial Judge Vaughn Walker 
due to his sexual orientation and the fact that the case concerned gay marriage rights in 
California). 
4. See id. at 1133 (denying the defendant-intervenors’ motion and finding no
evidence that Judge Walker would be incapable of being impartial). 
5. See, e.g., Perry, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1129 (applying an understanding of the
reasonable person who is familiar with the facts and law of the underlying challenge to 
Judge Walker’s impartiality). 
6. See infra Part II (discussing the federal appellate and Supreme Court litigation
over § 455). 
7. See infra Part III (using the Perry ruling to highlight the inconsistent approach
taken by the Second Circuit in Floyd). 
8. See infra Part IV (proposing changes to the statutory language of § 455 to
enable courts to consistently apply the standard). 
9. See infra Part V (concluding that the vague language of § 455 led to its
inconsistent application in Floyd and Perry). 
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II. BACKGROUND
A. 28 U.S.C. § 455 and the Case Law Interpreting It 
28 U.S.C. § 455, enacted by Congress in 1970, governs the 
disqualification of federal judges for impartiality and financial or fiduciary 
interest.10  Subsection (a) of § 455 provides a general standard for the 
disqualification of judges whose impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.11 Subsection (b) of § 455 provides additional self-recusal 
standards for federal judges due to personal involvement in the case or 
financial and fiduciary interests.12 
Federal judges are presumed to be impartial.13  The test for 
disqualification under § 455(a) is an objective test that views the judge’s 
conduct from the perspective of a reasonable third-person; one who does 
not engage in speculation but considers the specifically alleged facts 
suggesting bias that the challenging party advances.14  United States v. 
Holland helped articulate this reasonable person perspective.15  In Holland, 
the defendant was charged with mailing threats to the President of the 
United States, and when he discovered the trial judge’s phone number he 
left the judge threatening messages as well.16  The trial judge did not recuse 
himself and the Ninth Circuit agreed that recusal was not warranted under § 
455.17  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, although threats are not to be taken 
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012) (providing for the disqualification of federal
justices, judges, and magistrates for impartiality, financial, or fiduciary interest). 
11. See generally Maria G. Roberson, Annotation, Construction and application of
28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a), 40 A.L.R. FED. 954 (1978) (discussing the history of the 
disqualification statute from its origins as a subjective test to its currently objective 
test). 
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2012) (enumerating several scenarios, such as where a
judge has previously worked as an attorney on the case, where disqualification is 
warranted). 
13. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(explaining that federal judges are presumed to be impartial and are expected to rule on 
their assigned cases). 
14. See United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913-14 (9th Cir. 2008) (illustrating
that the 1974 amendment removed the subjectivity of “in [the judge’s] opinion” and 
replaced it with an objective test of a reasonable third party). 
15. See generally id. (analyzing a judge’s duty to recuse himself based on threats
made against the judge by a defendant in a pending case). 
16. See id. at 911 (recalling that the defendant, who had been previously convicted
of violent crimes, left threatening voice messages for the judge ruling on his guilty 
plea). 
17. See id. at 917 (affirming the trial judge’s decision not to recuse as the threats
were insufficient for a reasonable person to question the judge’s impartiality). 
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lightly, the analysis of a judge’s impartiality is not from the perspective of 
a “partly-informed-man-in-the-street.”18  Rather § 455(a) mandates recusal 
only when an objective and informed member of the public, with 
knowledge of the underlying facts and law, would find a reasonable basis 
for doubting the judge’s impartiality.19  Consequently, though perhaps a 
passing member of the public may have found the threats sufficient to 
justify recusal, the Ninth Circuit found that a knowledgeable observer who 
understands that judges have a “strong duty to sit” would not have 
supported recusal.20 
Section 455 calls for disqualification in circumstances that constitute an 
appearance of partiality, even where no actual bias is shown.21  
Additionally, the bias required for recusal must be extrajudicial—meaning 
the statements or actions by the judge must occur outside of court—and the 
§ 455 analysis not based upon in court rulings or comments made in the
proceeding at issue.22  This is known as the extrajudicial source doctrine, 
which, except in the rarest instances of favoritism, requires that the 
disqualification analysis ignore what the judge has said or learned from his 
participation in the instant case.23 
1. Liteky v. United States and Limited Exceptions to the Extrajudicial
Source Doctrine in Extreme Circumstances 
The extrajudicial source doctrine requires that for an impartiality 
analysis, a judge’s in court statements will not be considered except in rare 
circumstances.24  In Liteky v. United States, the Supreme Court refused to 
18. See id. at 914 (distinguishing the informed reasonable person who understands
the presumption that judges hear a case they are assigned to from a passing observer 
who may be shocked by threats against a judge). 
19. See In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1980) (finding rumors,
innuendos, and erroneous information published as fact insufficient to support a finding 
of factual bias).   
20. See Holland, 519 F.3d at 916-17 (ruling that, based on the presumption that
judges hear assigned cases, the defendant’s threats did not warrant a § 455 
disqualification). 
21. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988)
(establishing, after a 1976 amendment to the statute, that the § 455 disqualification 
applies where the objective appearance of bias, and not actual bias, is shown). 
22. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (applying the
extrajudicial doctrine for disqualification, meaning that the source of bias or 
impartiality must be out-of-court or extrajudicial). 
23. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966) (holding that a
judge’s “terse” exclusion of what he felt to be irrelevant evidence was insufficient to 
warrant disqualification, due to the extrajudicial source doctrine). 
24. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551 (explaining that the extrajudicial source doctrine
5
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grant a recusal motion based on a judge’s admonition of the defense, its 
witnesses, and the defendant throughout the course of the trial.25  At issue 
in Liteky was whether a judge’s alleged “anti-defendant” tone and his 
“cutting off” of defense witness testimony could be considered for a § 
455(a) analysis despite occurring in court during the proceeding at issue.26  
The Supreme Court ruled that the conduct complained of would not be 
considered because it occurred in court and did not rise to the level of 
“deep-seated” favoritism to justify an exception to the extrajudicial source 
doctrine.27 
The extrajudicial source doctrine, however, provides for a rare 
exception, allowing a judge’s in court statement to weigh on his 
impartiality when the judge’s statements exhibit such a high degree of 
favoritism that fair judgment would be impossible.28 In United States v. 
Antar, a judge stated in court that his goal from the start of the case was to 
give back to the public.29  Despite the extrajudicial source doctrine’s 
presumption that only out-of-court statements or actions by a judge are 
applicable under § 455(a), the Third Circuit in Antar ruled that the trial 
judge’s proclamation that his goal was to give back to the public provided a 
stark example of the antagonism to a party that justified an exception under 
Liteky.30  Despite occurring in court, the Third Circuit found the judge’s 
statements to exhibit such a high degree of favoritism to justify 
disqualification.31 
requires that only out-of-court, or extrajudicial statements by a judge bear on his 
impartiality). 
25. See id. at 542 (discussing underlying facts of the recusal motion, where the
defendant was convicted for willful destruction of property at a Military Reserve). 
26. See id. at 542-43 (examining whether displays of impatience with the defense
during trial was sufficient to justify an exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine). 
27. See id. at 555 (crafting a limited exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine
where an in-court statement can be considered when the evidence of an extreme 
animosity to a party makes the judge unable to render fair judgment). 
28. See id. at 551 (finding that despite the existence of the exception, the general
presumption favors the exclusion of in court statements by a judge for a § 455 
analysis). 
29. See United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 576 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding an
exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine where the judge made it clear to the 
parties that his goal in the case was different than what it should have been). 
30. See id. at 576 (ruling that the trial judge’s stated wishes provided the
government such an easy path to conviction that fair judgment was virtually 
impossible). 
31. See id. at 584 (recognizing the limited nature of an extrajudicial source
doctrine exception while remanding the case to a different trial judge). 
6
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol23/iss1/6
2014] JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY 203 
While the exception provided in Antar saw the existence of extreme 
favoritism, predictions by a judge about the outcome of a trial made in 
court, even against a criminal defendant, are not sufficient to warrant an 
exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine.32  In United States v. Young, 
the defendant was convicted in district court in Colorado for two counts of 
money laundering, and the trial judge stated during a guilty plea colloquy 
that if the defendant proceeded to trial, she obviously would be convicted.33  
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the trial judge’s “prediction” to defense 
counsel did not support a finding of deep seated favoritism, thereby 
affirming the limited circumstances that permit an extrajudicial source 
doctrine exception.34  The Tenth Circuit found the judge’s statement 
insufficient to warrant an exception because the judge’s remarks about 
what the jury may find does not impact his ability to render fair judgment, 
nor did it indicate that he would be unable to carry out his responsibilities 
impartially.35  Consequently, the court refused to disqualify the Young 
judge under § 455(a).36 
2. Extraordinary Circumstances and Statements to the Media:  Nichols v.
Alley and U.S. v. Cooley 
Two Tenth Circuit cases from the mid-nineties explain the kind of 
conduct that may cause a reasonable observer to question a judge’s 
impartiality in highly publicized cases.37  Statements that a judge makes to 
the media can raise the appearance of bias when the judge discusses the 
parties’ claims in a case, such as appearing on television criticizing a party 
32. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405, 1414 (10th Cir. 1995)
(refusing to grant a recusal where the trial judge stated in pretrial that it was clear the 
defendant would be convicted). 
33. See id. (describing the colloquy between defense counsel and the trial judge,
where the judge stated that a preview of the “coming attractions” involved the 
defendant being convicted and sent to county jail). 
34. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554 (maintaining that, absent a limited exception, the §
455 analysis is confined to out-of-court statements and actions by a judge). 
35. See Young, 45 F.3d at 1415-16 (explaining that nothing in the judge’s
prediction of the case’s outcome evinced deep seated favoritism or an unwillingness to 
rule impartially). 
36. See id. at 1416 (affirming the defendant’s conviction and finding no § 455
violations based on the judge prediction of guilt). 
37. See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding the
appearance of bias in a trial of a bombing suspect where the bomb detonated a block 
away from the judge’s chambers); United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir. 
1993) (addressing the recusal of a judge who appeared on Nightline discussing the 
merits of a case he was hearing).  
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or conducting “secret interviews” discussing the specific claims.38  In 
Cooley, the defendants were charged with willfully impeding United States 
Marshals during an abortion protest.39  The district judge who presided over 
the case, Judge Patrick Kelly, chose to conduct an interview with Barbara 
Walters on Nightline, in which he stated in part that the abortion protesters 
were breaking the law.40  On appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Judge 
Kelly abused his discretion in denying the recusal motion because the 
judge’s voluntary appearance on a national television show to discuss and 
offer his opinion on ongoing protests, the legality of which he was charged 
with determining, created the appearance of bias in the mind of a 
reasonable person under § 455(a).41 
Nevertheless, judges cannot control all that is written about them, and 
media interviews do not cause per se disqualification because reporters’ 
personal opinions or characterizations of judges do not generally cause a 
reasonable observer to question a judge’s impartiality.42 
When considering a motion to disqualify, reviewing courts engage in 
several factual analyses, such as examining statements that judges make to 
the media, threats made against the judge, and a judge’s relationship with 
the parties.43 In Nichols v. Alley, the petitioner was an accomplice to the 
Oklahoma City Bombing that killed 169 people.44  Nichols requested 
recusal of the judge assigned to the case, Judge Wayne Alley, because the 
38. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 115-16 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(holding that a federal judge’s interviews discussing the merits of an ongoing antitrust 
case, with hand-picked reporters, gave rise to an appearance of bias). 
39. See id. at 989 (describing the basis for the charges, where protesters scaled the
walls of a Kansas abortion clinic and blocked access to the clinic from the inside). 
40. See id. at 995 (recounting Judge Kelly’s appearance on Nightline, where he
stated that the clinic protesters were acting illegally and that he would make sure that 
his injunctive order against the protesters would be honored). 
41. See Cooley, 1 F.3d at 995 (finding that Judge Kelly’s conduct so displayed the
appearance of bias that it could not survive an abuse of discretion review standard, let 
alone de novo). 
42. See Nichols, 71 F.3d at 351 (enumerating several factual scenarios, such as
media reports characterizing or misattributing quotes to the judge, prior rulings, and 
familiarity with the parties, as insufficient to find of the appearance of partiality under 
§ 455(a)).
43. See id. (recounting the common impartiality analyses claims based on rumor,
innuendo, and speculation, that do not give rise to a finding of § 455(a) partiality). 
44. See generally Nancy Gibbs, The Blood of Innocents, TIME, June 24, 2001,
http://www.content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,134077,00.html (describing 
the scene on the ground when a bomb was detonated at the Alfred P. Murrah federal 
building in Oklahoma City killing over 160 people and wounding several hundred 
more). 
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judge’s courtroom and chambers was a mere one block away from the 
bombing and the blast shattered the windows of his chambers and injured a 
member of his staff.45  The Tenth Circuit, while systematically examining 
the standards for recusal and bias, found that these extraordinary facts gave 
rise to an appearance of bias despite no fault on the part of Judge Alley.46  
The court ruled that, based on the damage cause to Judge Alley’s chambers 
and his proximity to the blast, a reasonable observer could question Judge 
Alley’s impartiality.47  Although the facts of Nichols are very unusual, its 
significance stems from the fact that the Nichols court extensively 
discussed the circumstances such as speaking on the merits of the case or 
having a fiduciary interest in the outcome that give rise to the appearance 
of partiality.48  Nichols supports the rule that, absent unusual circumstances 
such as a party destroying the judge’s chambers, mere statements to the 
media, threats made against the judge, and prior rulings by a judge are 
insufficient for disqualification.49 
3. Hormel v. Helvering and Review of Issues Not Raised Below
Although reviewing courts are generally limited to the issues raised by
parties below, there is an exception where not allowing the reviewing court 
to rule on the issue would constitute a plain miscarriage of justice.50  In 
Hormel v. Helvering the Supreme Court established that, in order to 
prevent the plain miscarriage of justice, a reviewing court may consider 
and rule on issues not raised by the lower court or the parties.51  The 
45. See Nichols, 71 F.3d at 349-50 (noting the destruction that the bomb caused in
Judge Alley’s chambers, including the injury of a member of his staff, destruction of 
the skylight, and breaking of windows). 
46. See id. at 352 (acknowledging that Judge Alley did nothing wrong, however
still finding that Judge Alley’s case is outside the scope of traditional § 455 analyses). 
47. See id. (finding that the unique relationship between Judge Alley and the
defendant would lead a reasonable observer to question his impartiality due to the 
impact that the defendant’s actions had on Judge Alley’s life). 
48. See id. at 351 (describing the factual circumstances, including speculation,
threats, media appearances, and prior rulings, that courts examine under § 455(a) and 
distinguishing the extraordinary facts of Nichols from these facts). 
49. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(explaining that § 455(a) carries a presumption of judicial impartiality that the 
challenging party must overcome to receive the remedy of disqualification). 
50. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 555 (1941) (recognizing that, despite a
limited exception, a reviewing court may only rule on issues raised by the parties in the 
lower court). 
51. See id. at 557 (finding that, where the judge’s statements make fair judgment
appear impossible, a reviewing court may consider in-court statements). 
9
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petitioner in Hormel was a taxpayer who did not include trust income in his 
returns, and the Board of Tax Appeals concluded that he acted 
appropriately under the two Internal Revenue Code provisions argued for 
by the Commissioner, § § 166 and 167.52  On appeal, the Commissioner 
argued successfully to the Eighth Circuit that § 22(a) applied even though 
the applicability of that statute was not raised below.53  The Supreme Court 
upheld the Eighth Circuit decision, despite the general understanding that 
reviewing courts should confine their analysis to issues raised below, 
because the Commissioner did not have the benefit of § 22(a) at the time of 
the Tax Board ruling and it would have been impossible for the 
Commissioner to make the 22(a) arguments to the Tax Board.54  Therefore, 
the Supreme Court concluded that the Eighth Circuit properly ruled by 
allowing a consideration of § 22(a) in order to prevent a plain miscarriage 
of justice.55 
B. The Perry Litigation and Impartiality Ruling 
In 2008, California voters passed Proposition 8, which limited the 
definition of marriage to one man and one woman and thereby outlawed 
same-sex marriage in the state.56  Two same-sex couples filed suit against 
the Governor of California alleging violations of due process and equal 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.57  Proponents of Proposition 
8 intervened on behalf of the defendants, and the city and county of San 
Francisco intervened on behalf of the plaintiffs.58 
52. See id. at 554-55 (highlighting the Tax Board of Appeals’ ruling that the
petitioner’s trust income was not taxable under Internal Revenue Code § 167, and 
therefore the Commissioner should not have assessed a deficiency). 
53. See id. at 560 (holding that to limit all appellate considerations to only issues
raised below would, in the instance of § 22(a), defeat rather than promote the ends of 
justice). 
54. See id. at 558 (avoiding a hard and fast limit of appellate review and allowing
for special circumstances where a court may examine issues not raised previously). 
55. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting
Justice Black’s proclamations in Hormel set the stage for appellate review of issues not 
raised in the lower courts).   
56. See Randal C. Archibold & Abby Goodnough, California Voters Ban Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/politics/06ballot.html?_r=0 (reporting that 
California voters passed Proposition 8 with 52% of the vote in an added referendum 
portion to the 2008 ballot).  
57. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(chronicling the history of Perry’s underlying challenge to Proposition 8, which alleged 
that the amendment violated same-sex couples’ right to equal protection).   
58. See Press Release, City Attorney of San Francisco, San Francisco Moves to
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On August 4, 2010, Judge Vaughn Walker of the Northern District of 
California ruled that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.59  In 
response, the defendant-intervenors challenged Judge Walker’s ruling in 
the case, arguing that Judge Walker’s sexual orientation and his same-sex 
relationship diminished his ability to rule impartially.60  Another judge in 
the Northern District of California, Judge James Ware, analyzed the 
defendant-intervenors’ motion to disqualify and ultimately denied their 
request.61 Judge Ware concluded that Judge Walker’s impartiality could not 
reasonably be questioned under § 455 because, like other minority groups, 
Judge Walker’s sexual orientation does not alone create actual bias nor the 
appearance of bias.62  Therefore, Judge Ware’s ruling concluded that under 
§ 455(a), a reasonable, thoughtful person with knowledge of the underlying
facts and law could not question a judge’s impartiality based on speculation 
that the judge’s membership in a minority class would limit his ability to 
rule impartially in a case affecting that class.63 
C. The Floyd Litigation and Impartiality Ruling 
In January 2008, a class-certified group of African Americans and Latin 
Americans filed a suit against the NYPD in Floyd v. City of New York 
alleging that their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been 
violated by the NYPD stop-and-frisks conducted without reasonable 
articulable suspicion.64  The case was assigned to Judge Shira Scheindlin, 
Intervene in Federal Challenge to Proposition 8 (July 23, 2009) (explaining that the city 
has a “unique public sector perspective” on having to enforce a discriminatory law). 
59. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 991 (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate
Proposition 8 under Due Process, but rational basis to invalidate it under Equal 
Protection). 
60. See Judge Who Struck Down Proposition 8 Knew Case Would Go Far,
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (June 29, 2013) (downloaded using NPR’s media player) 
(explaining in an interview how Judge Walker predicted that his sexual orientation 
would be at the forefront of the litigation). 
61. See generally Perry, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2011)(assessing
Judge Walker’s ability to rule on the Perry case under § 455(a) based on claimed bias 
due to the judge’s sexual orientation). 
62. See id. at 1128-29 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (analogizing that disqualifying Judge
Walker for his membership in a class would be akin to disqualifying other groups, such 
as women, from ruling on cases that involved issues affecting women as a whole). 
63. See id. at 1131 (refusing to speculate that Judge Walker’s interest in marrying
his partner would cause a well-informed, thoughtful observer to question Judge 
Walker’s impartiality). 
64. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(agreeing with the plaintiffs, after the presentation of statistics compiled over several 
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who had been a federal judge since 1994.65  On August 12, 2013, following 
a nine-week trial, Judge Scheindlin held that the City of New York indeed 
violated the plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.66 
The Second Circuit chose to review Judge Scheindlin’s impartiality sua 
sponte because of comments she made to the media while the case was 
being litigated and comments she made to the plaintiffs in Daniels v. City 
of New York, an action that also dealt with NYPD civil rights violations.67  
During a motion to extend the settlement period in Daniels, Judge 
Scheindlin engaged in a colloquy with the plaintiffs.68  Specifically, she 
told the Daniels plaintiffs that New York City violated its own anti-
profiling policy and that the plaintiffs had proof of racial profiling in a 
“good constitutional case.”69 Judge Scheindlin additionally told the Daniels 
plaintiffs that they could mark their claim as related to the Floyd 
litigation.70 
Furthermore, while Floyd was being litigated, Judge Scheindlin 
conducted interviews with The New Yorker and The New York Law 
Journal, where she discussed the many civil rights suits she has heard 
against the NYPD, and a mayoral report that found that she granted 
motions to suppress more frequently than her colleagues.71 Additionally, 
years, that the implementation of the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk policy is racially 
discriminatory).   
65. See Jeffrey Toobin, Rights and Wrongs: A Judge Takes on Stop-and-Frisk,
NEW YORKER, May 17, 2013,  
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/05/27/130527fa_fact_toob (describing 
Judge Shcheindlin’s background and her experience as a judge in civil rights cases, 
hearing suits against police officers and New York City since her appointment in 
1994). 
66. See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 658 (ruling that, based on the statistics showing
the prevalence of unjustified stops of innocent blacks and Hispanics, the city is liable 
for violating the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights). 
67. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 135-37 (2d Cir. 2013)
(recognizing that Judge Scheindlin felt that the NYPD had violated its own anti-
discrimination and anti-profiling policies based on the plaintiffs’ claims).   
68. See id. at 137 (discussing the NYPD’s compliance, or lack of compliance, with
its own written rule concerning racial profiling). 
69. See id. at 135 (suggesting to the plaintiffs that they may have a basis to bring
suit against the city for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations). 
70. See id. at 142 (identifying the racial profiling by the NYPD under a probable
cause analysis in Daniels as related to the racial profiling under reasonable articulable 
suspicion analysis in Floyd). 
71. See Larry Nuemeister, NY ‘frisk’ judge calls criticism ‘below-the-belt,’
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 19, 2013, http://www.news.yahoo.com/ny-frisk-judge-calls-
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Judge Scheindlin described herself as a jurist who is skeptical of law 
enforcement.72 Judge Scheindlin also discussed with the media a letter 
written by the New York Lawyers Association, which purported to show 
that Judge Scheindlin is biased against law enforcement.73  In the article 
published by The New Yorker, titled “A Judge Takes On Stop-and-Frisk,” 
Judge Scheindlin described her commitment to uphold the Bill of Rights 
and spoke about her interactions with the NYPD in her time as a federal 
judge, during which she has found that police had lied, discriminated 
against people of color, and violated the rights of citizens.74 
In the fall of 2013, the Second Circuit reviewed Judge Scheindlin’s 
impartiality sua sponte, citing Hormel as its justification for doing so.75  On 
October 31, 2013, the panel issued a short order declaring that by making 
the above statements, Judge Scheindlin ran afoul of Canon 3C of the 
Judicial Code of Conduct, thereby vacating her decision and removing her 
from the case.76  However, on November 13, the same Second Circuit panel 
issued a follow up to its October 31 order, relaxing its critique of Judge 
Scheindlin, but nonetheless affirming her disqualification.77  In the opinion 
issued on November 13, the Second Circuit elaborated on its findings of 
bias, and focused specifically on Judge Scheindlin’s conduct under 28 
U.S.C. § 455(a).78  The court did not conclude that Judge Scheindlin was 
criticism-below-belt-160257320.html (describing Judge Scheindlin’s interactions with 
the NYPD in court where she says she has seen examples of discrimination and lying 
on the stand). 
72. See id. (distinguishing herself from judges who are “a little more timid to
maybe disagree with the U.S. Attorney’s Office”). 
73. See Mark Hamblett, Stop–and–Frisk Judge Relishes her 
Independence, N.Y.L.J, May 20, 2013, 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202600625151 (describing Judge 
Scheindlin’s civil-rights centered jurisprudence). 
74. See Toobin, Rights and Wrongs, supra note 65, at 2 (framing the then-ongoing
Floyd litigation around Judge Scheindlin’s history with the NYPD, which extended 
back to civil rights cases she has heard against the city since 1994). 
75. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 2013) (invoking
Hormel’s review of issues not raised below in order to prevent a plain miscarriage of 
justice). 
76. See generally Ligon v. City of New York, 538 F. App’x 101 (2d Cir. 2013)
(concluding, beyond just a finding of § 455 bias, that Judge Scheindlin ran afoul of the 
Code of Conduct for United States Judges). 
77. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 129  (establishing that the court
made no findings that Judge Scheindlin has engaged in judicial misconduct). 
78. See id. at 123 (illustrating that § 455(a) is an objective test that does not
require actual bias, but only the appearance of bias, to justify disqualification). 
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actually biased.79 Instead, it reasoned that Judge Scheindlin’s comments 
about the validity of the plaintiff’s claim in Daniels, along with her 
comments to the media about her unfavorable history with the NYPD, 
taken together, created the appearance of bias such that she should be 
disqualified under § 455(a).80  The court thereafter denied Judge 
Scheindlin’s motion to protest, concluding that she lacked standing to 
challenge the reassignment.81  The Second Circuit’s ruling, and the 
outcome of that ruling, offers a more stringent application of § 455 than in 
Perry, and leads to unpredictable results for federal courts applying the § 
455 disqualification statute.82 
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Second Circuit Misapplied § 455(a) in Concluding that Judge 
Scheindlin’s Impartiality Could Reasonably be Questioned Because the 
Court Lowered the Reasonable Person Standard Articulated in § 455(a) 
Case Law. 
Comparing the standards applied by the Northern District of California’s 
assessment of Judge Ware in Perry with the Second Circuit’s assessment of 
Judge Scheindlin in Floyd illustrates the errors that the Second Circuit 
made in applying § 455(a).83  First, while the Perry court considered the 
proper burden to overcome in disqualifying a federal judge, the Second 
Circuit incorrectly applied a lower standard that more easily triggered 
disqualification.84  Second, the Second Circuit did not engage in a § 455 
79. See id. at 129 (establishing that the court made no finding of actual bias in
Judge Scheindlin’s case, just the appearance of bias). 
80. See id. at 125, 129 (concluding that, given the public scrutiny of the Floyd
litigation, Judge Scheindlin’s comments in Daniels gave the appearance of steering the 
case to her docket). 
81. See In re Motion of Dist. Judge, 736 F.3d 166, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding,
in part, that Judge Scheindlin has no standing to protest her reassignment). 
82. Compare Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1133  (N.D. Cal.
2011) (finding no appearance of bias with Judge Walker under § 455), with In re 
Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 129 (ruling that a judge’s statements to the media 
and a colloquy with the plaintiffs in a related case contravened § 455). 
83. See generally Perry, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1133 (assessing Judge Walker’s
appearance of impartiality based on the defendant-intervenors’ claim that his sexual 
orientation barred impartial judgment under § 455(a)); In re Reassignment of Cases, 
736 F.3d at 129 (analyzing Judge Scheindlin’s appearance of impartiality under § 
455(a)). 
84. See Perry, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1129 (acknowledging the substantial burden that
a party challenging a judge’s impartiality bears). 
14
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol23/iss1/6
2014] JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY 211 
reasonable person analysis, which views the reasonable person as one with 
knowledge of the underlying facts and law.85  Finally, the extrajudicial 
source doctrine, and its application to Judge Scheindlin’s case, does not 
support a finding of the appearance of impartiality under § 455 because her 
statements in Daniels do not rise to the level of favoritism that warrant an 
exception.86 
1. The Northern District of California Applied the Appropriate Standard
Because it Acknowledged the Heavy Burden to Show that a Judge’s 
Impartiality May Reasonably be Questioned. 
The analysis under § 455 begins with the presumption that a judge is 
impartial, which creates a heavy burden for the party seeking 
disqualification.87  In its opinion, the Northern District of California cited 
the substantial burden in its assessment of Judge Walker under § 455(a) 
and upheld that burden by refusing to speculate as to whether Judge Walker 
was biased merely because of his sexual orientation.88  The Northern 
District of California maintained that questioning Judge Walker’s 
impartiality merely on the basis of his involvement in a same sex 
relationship would force the court to accede to unsubstantiated suspicion 
that is insufficient under § 455(a).89  Section 455(a) requires a fact-specific 
analysis, and the defendant-intervenors carried the burden of providing 
articulable facts giving rise to a finding of partiality.90  To meet their 
burden, the defendant-intervenors needed to allege specific facts beyond a 
mere generalization that Judge Walker’s sexual orientation influenced his 
85. See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008)
(recognizing that in the context of § 455(a), the reasonable person is someone who 
“understand[s] all the relevant facts” and “has examined the record and law”). 
86. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994) (explaining that under
the extrajudicial source doctrine, opinions held by judges because of what they learned 
in earlier proceedings are not to be characterized as bias or prejudice). 
87. See Holland, 519 F.3d at 911-12 (noting that the proposition that a judge
should participate in their cases absent legitimate reason is derived from Article III of 
the Constitution).  
88. See Torres v. Chrysler Fin. Co., No. C 07-00915 JW, 2007 WL 3165665, at *1
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (establishing that a federal judge is presumed to be impartial, and the 
party seeking disqualification must meet a high burden to show bias).   
89. See Clemens v. U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, 428
F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2005) (articulating that the party challenging a judge cannot 
meet the § 455 burden by speculating about a relationship, without evidence of bias). 
90. See id. at 1178 (articulating that the § 455(a) analysis is fact-specific and
focuses on the unique circumstances in the present case, without engaging in 
speculation). 
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potential bias, which they failed to do, and the Northern District 
appropriately denied their motion.91 
On the other hand, the Second Circuit panel in its opinion issued on 
November 13, 2013, did not acknowledge the substantial burden to 
overcome the presumption that a judge lacks impartiality.92  Perhaps, the 
Second Circuit did not acknowledge the burden a party bears because a 
party did not actually raise the issue.93  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
precedent that the Second Circuit relied on for its sua sponte justification, 
Hormel v. Helvering, allows for appellate review of an issue not raised 
below in “exceptional” cases with “peculiar” circumstances.94  Therefore, 
the Second Circuit, in invoking Hormel, would presumably mention the 
extraordinary circumstances of Judge Scheindlin’s bias or the plain 
miscarriage of justice that would result from allowing her to preside over 
the case.95  In other words, by citing Hormel as its justification for 
reviewing judge Scheindlin’s impartiality sua sponte, the court implicitly 
acknowledged that her case is peculiar, or alternatively, that not doing so 
would result in a plain miscarriage of justice.96  Yet, the Second Circuit’s 
opinion is replete with language softening its criticism of Judge Scheindlin 
and in fact, the court conceded that she may not be biased.97  By invoking 
Hormel, which allows for review of issues not raised below only in peculiar 
circumstances or to present a miscarriage of justice, one would expect that 
the Second Circuit’s opinion would speak to the injustice that would result 
91. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1133 ((N.D. Cal. 2011)
(taking the defendant-intervenors’ argument to its logical conclusion and refusing to 
find that membership in a minority precludes a judge from ruling on a case that affects 
that class). 
92. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining
that, though the issue of recusal was not raised either by the parties or the judge herself 
in the district court or this court, there is no barrier to reassigning the cases sua sponte). 
93. See id. at 129 (addressing Judge Scheindlin’s impartiality sua sponte, as
neither party raised the issue nor invoked § 455). 
94. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941) (identifying exceptional
cases or peculiar circumstances as justification for a reviewing court to consider issues 
not raised below). 
95. See id. at 558 (noting the general presumption that appellate courts do not
weigh on issues not raised below or preserved for appeal, except when there is a plain 
miscarriage of justice). 
96. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 129 (appealing to Justice Black’s
proclamation in Hormel, that an appellate court may pass upon issues not raised below 
in order to prevent injustice to the parties). 
97. See id. at 124 (emphasizing that the court makes no findings of misconduct,
actual bias, or actual partiality, in contrast to its October 31 ruling that found that Judge 
Scheindlin violated the Code of Judicial Ethics). 
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if the court did not step in.98  Instead, the Second Circuit’s admission that 
Judge Scheindlin lacked actual bias belies the notion that Judge 
Scheindlin’s case was extraordinary such that it risked injustice under 
Hormel.99  While no actual bias was found in the Nichols case as well, the 
Nichols court made clear that Judge Alley’s case was unusual in that no 
direct factual comparison can be made to the standard § 455 analyses such 
as media interviews or relationships with the parties.100  Therefore, while 
both Floyd and Nichols found that a judge was not actually biased, the 
Floyd court focused on the common § 455(a) analyses such as media 
interviews.101  Though both cases illustrate disqualification without actual 
bias, Nichols is distinguishable in that Judge Alley’s disqualification was 
due to the “extraordinary circumstances” of Judge Alley’s chambers being 
destroyed—so extraordinary that the court found “no case to look to for 
guidance.”102 
As the Perry court stated, disqualification of a federal judge places a 
high burden on the challenging party, and Hormel requires appellate review 
only in exceptional circumstances, such as where a party could not make an 
argument at trial that could be made on appeal due to a subsequent 
Supreme Court decision.103  Therefore, because Judge Scheindlin’s recusal 
was not raised below, the Second Circuit must contend with the already 
high standard of recusal in addition to the “exceptional circumstances” 
98. See Hormel, 312 U.S. at 557 (crafting a limited exception for appellate
intervention on a new issue where not doing so would result in a miscarriage of 
justice). 
99. Compare In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 124 (softening the court’s
earlier ruling that Judge Scheindlin ran afoul of the Judicial Code and finding no actual 
bias, only the appearance of bias), with Hormel, 312 U.S. at 557 (calling for appellate 
review of an issue not raised below only in circumstances that risk the plain miscarriage 
of justice). 
 100.   See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 352 (10th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging that 
there “is no similar case” with which to compare the “extraordinary” facts of Judge 
Alley’s chambers being destroyed by the defendant he would later have to rule over). 
 101.   Compare In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 125-29 (analyzing Judge 
Scheindlin based on statements that she made to the media and to the plaintiffs in 
another case), with Nichols, 71 F.3d at 352 (assessing Judge Alley based on the fact 
that his chambers was one block away from a bomb detonation that the defendant was 
partially responsible for). 
 102.   See Nichols, 71 F.3d at 352 (maintaining that the § 455 analysis is a factual 
one, but there are nevertheless no cases with such a extraordinary facts to offer a direct 
comparison). 
 103.  See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(acknowledging that the party challenging a federal judge’s impartiality carries a 
substantial burden to justify the removal of the judge). 
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requirement from Hormel.104  However, because the court spent much of 
the opinion mitigating its criticism of Judge Scheindlin, its reliance on 
Hormel to justify Judge Scheindlin’s disqualification is misplaced.105 
Additionally, the factual differences between the two cases illustrate why 
the Second Circuit erred in relying on Hormel.106  For instance, in Hormel, 
the Commissioner actually raised the § 22(a) arguments to the appellate 
court, while New York City did not argue in the District Court or on appeal 
that Judge Scheindlin should be disqualified.107  Unlike in Hormel, where 
the § 22(a) argument had not been applied to the taxpayer’s situation until 
after the lower court ruling, in Floyd the City had ample opportunity to 
argue that Judge Scheindlin should be disqualified.108  Judge Scheindlin’s 
interviews with The New Yorker and The New York Law Journal were 
published in May 2013, a few months prior to her August 2013 ruling, 
meaning the City could have raised her impartiality during the 
proceedings.109 Conversely, in Hormel, the Supreme Court had not 
authorized § 22(a)’s application to the taxpayer until after judgment had 
been rendered in the taxpayer’s favor.110  Therefore, the Commissioner was 
“injusticed” in Hormel because it could not have made an argument to the 
lower court that was later raised on appeal whereas the City could have, but 
 104.  See Hormel, 312 U.S. at 557 (allowing an appellate court to consider an issue 
not raised below only in order to prevent injustice to one of the parties).  
105.  Cf. Jeffrey Toobin, The Preposterous Removal of Judge Scheindlin, NEW
YORKER, Oct. 31 2013, 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/10/the-preposterous-removal-
of-judge-scheindlin.html (arguing, after his interviews became the subject of the ruling, 
that the Second Circuit mischaracterized Judge Scheindlin’s statements to the press).  
 106.   See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F. 3d at 129 (turning to Hormel to 
justify ruling on Judge Scheindlin’s impartiality despite the issue not being raised by 
either party at the district or circuit level). 
 107.   Compare Hormel, 312 U.S. at 554-56 (discussing the Eighth Circuit ruling, 
where the Commissioner first introduced the § 22(a) argument after the Supreme Court 
ruled that § 22(a) was applicable to trust income), with In re Reassignment of Cases, 
736 F. 3d at 129 (acknowledging that Judge Scheindlin’s impartiality was reviewed sua 
sponte). 
 108.  See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.2d at 125-29 (assessing Judge 
Scheindlin’s impartiality based on media interviews that were published while she was 
hearing the case). 
 109.  See, e.g., Toobin, Rights and Wrongs, supra note 65, at 1 (discussing with 
Judge Scheindlin her prior in-court interactions with the NYPD while the Floyd case 
was being litigated). 
 110.   See Hormel, 312 U.S. at 559 (noting that the Commissioner could not make 
use of § 22(a) in the lower court because the Supreme Court had not yet rendered it 
applicable to trust income like petitioner’s until its subsequent decision in Helvering). 
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chose not to make the disqualification argument in the lower court.111  
These factual differences show why Floyd was not a “plain miscarriage of 
justice” as illustrated by Hormel, especially when considered in light of the 
softening of its initial criticism of Judge Scheindlin that characterized the 
order issued on November 13.112 
2. The Northern District of California Correctly Applied the
Knowledgeable Reasonable Person Standard Under § 455(a), While the 
Second Circuit Relied on a Less-informed Reasonable Person that Lowered 
the Standard for Disqualification 
The Northern District of California relied on a complete definition of 
who the reasonable person is under a § 455(a) analysis.113  A § 455(a) 
reasonable person is not just a passing observer, but rather someone with 
knowledge of the facts and law of the underlying action.114  The reasonable 
person under § 455(a) does not contemplate a member of the general public 
who is unaware of the current litigation and its underlying issues.115  The 
Northern District of California recognized as much by stating that the 
challenging party must carry the heavy burden.116  The Second Circuit, on 
the other hand, discussed a general reasonable “observer” without any 
mention of the individual with familiarity of the facts and law of the 
underlying action, which is inconsistent with § 455(a).117 
The Second Circuit’s understanding of the reasonable person under § 
455(a) effectively lowered the standard to trigger disqualification because it 
 111.  See id. at 558 (allowing for appellate review of issues not raised below in 
circumstances that would result in a “miscarriage of justice”). 
 112.  See, e.g., In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 124 (finding that Judge 
Scheindlin was not actually biased, and mitigating its criticisms of Judge Scheindlin 
from the original order that found she violated the Code of Judicial Conduct). 
 113.  See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012) (mandating recusal when a reasonable person 
may question a federal justice, judge, or magistrate’s impartiality). 
 114.  See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 
2011)(citing United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008)) (recognizing 
that in the context of § 455(a), the reasonable person is not someone who is overly 
sensitive to bias but rather a reasonable thoughtful observer that understands the facts 
and law). 
 115.  See id. at 1130 (maintaining that a fact is not necessarily a basis for 
questioning a judge’s impartiality merely because it might lead to public questioning of 
the judge’s impartiality). 
 116.   See id. (acknowledging that judges are presumed to be impartial and that 
blanket statements about a judge’s bias due to his membership in a class are 
insufficient to overcome this presumption).  
 117.  See generally In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 125  (2d Cir. 2013) 
(noting that the reasonable observer in this situation would find partiality).   
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did not consider that a reasonable person is someone who has examined the 
facts and law of the current case.118  The requirement that a reasonable 
person has examined the record of the case heightens the standard, or 
makes the reasonable person less sensitive to bias, because the Ninth 
Circuit in Holland explained that the § 455 reasonable person does not 
mandate recusal upon mere suspicion of bias.119  The Second Circuit 
argued that Judge Scheindlin’s interviews could cause a reasonable 
observer to question her impartiality.120  However, the Second Circuit 
consistently used the language “reasonable observer” as a perspective from 
which it analyzed Judge Scheindlin’s impartiality.121  This reasonable 
observer is not the same as the reasonable person who is familiar with the 
case and law at hand, as evidenced by the fact that the defendants, surely 
familiar with the record, the law, and Judge Scheindlin’s interviews, did 
not request recusal.122  In Holland, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the 
appropriate standard—the knowledgeable reasonable person—from a 
“partially-informed-man-in-the-street.”123  Moreover, in Holland, the judge 
was faced with threats from the defendant who had a violent history yet the 
Ninth Circuit found that these threats may alarm a passerby, but not one 
with knowledge of the law that judges have a duty to sit in the cases they 
are assigned.124  The Second Circuit failed to acknowledge that the § 455 
reasonable person has knowledge of the presumption that judges should 
hear their assigned cases.125 In other words, unlike the Perry court, the 
 118.  See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting 
that in the § 455(a) analysis, the reasonable person is thoughtful and not unduly 
suspicious). 
 119.  See id. (discussing the fact that a reasonable person should be well-informed 
about the facts and law under § 455(a)). 
 120.  See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 125-26 (holding that a reasonable 
observer may question Judge Scheindlin’s impartiality due to the comments she made 
to the press and her colloquy with the Daniels’ plaintiffs).  
 121.  See id. at 124, 126 (discussing the colloquy with the plaintiffs in Daniels to the 
extent that it would cause a reasonable “observer” to question Judge Scheindlin’s 
impartiality). 
 122.  See id. at 128 (noting that neither party raised the issue of Judge Scheindlin’s 
impartiality). 
 123.  Holland, 519 F.3d at 914 (recalling that the § 455 analysis is not subjective 
and is not concerned with a judge’s personal feelings, but rather how a thoughtful third 
person would interpret the judge’s impartiality). 
 124.   See id. at 915-16 (establishing that the threats made by the defendant—an 
individual who had been previously convicted of armed robbery and assault with a 
deadly weapon—still did not mandate recusal under a § 455(a) reasonable person 
analysis). 
125.   See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 124-29 (analyzing Judge 
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Second Circuit did not begin its analysis from the perspective of a 
reasonable observer who is familiar with the facts and law of the case, and 
in so doing, misapplied the § 455(a) standard for disqualification.126 
B. Judge Scheindlin’s Interviews with The New Yorker and The New York 
Law Journal are Insufficient to Show the Appearance of Bias Because She 
Does Not Speak about the Merits of the Claims in the Floyd Case 
The Second Circuit erred in ruling that the interviews Judge Scheindlin 
conducted with The New Yorker and The New York Law Journal could 
cause one to question her impartiality because the reporters made the 
characterizations of Judge Scheindlin and she did not discuss the merits of 
the Floyd case in those interviews.127  The Tenth Circuit’s opinion in 
Cooley is instructive of the type of judge-media interactions that normally 
do not justify recusal.128 
Looking first to the piece in The New Yorker, the characterizations of 
Judge Scheindlin and descriptions of her battles with the NYPD are made 
by the author, Jeffery Toobin, and not by the judge herself.129  For instance, 
the title of the article, “A Judge Takes on Stop-and-Frisk” evokes Judge 
Scheindlin’s stance on the merits of NYC’s stop and frisk policy.130  
Scheindlin’s interviews with the media and her statements in Daniels from the 
perspective of a reasonable observer, not a well informed third person with knowledge 
of a judge’s duty to sit). 
 126.  Compare Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 
2011) (recognizing that the reasonable person under § 455(a) is well-informed with the 
facts and law at hand), with In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 124 
(characterizing the § 455(a) analysis as a reasonable observer, without mention of the 
requirement that the hypothetical person be familiar with the underlying facts and law). 
See also Holland, 519 F.3d at 914 (recognizing that in the context of § 455(a), the 
reasonable person is not someone who is “hypersensitive or unduly suspicious”). 
 127.  See Recusal: Analysis of Case Law Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 & 144, 20 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (2002), available at 
https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/recusal.pdf [hereinafter FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER] (outlining that Circuit Court interpretations of § 455(a) permit judges to speak 
to reporters during ongoing litigation, so long as characterizations about the case are 
made by the reporters and not the judge). 
 128.  See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993-94 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing 
the factual circumstances such as prior rulings, statements in court by the judge, and 
mere familiarity with the parties as not giving rise to finding of partiality). 
 129.  See, e.g., Toobin, Rights and Wrongs, supra note 65, at 1 (describing that in 
various decisions, Judge Scheindlin has found that police lied and discriminated on the 
basis of race).  
 130.  See id. (framing the piece as a judge taking on the NYPD’s policy, without 
having the judge comment on the actual stop-and-frisk policy at hand in the case). 
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Moreover, the statements Judge Scheindlin does make in the interview, 
namely that she believes in upholding the Constitution and Bill of Rights, is 
consistent with what judges are permitted to say according to Cooley.131  In 
Cooley, Judge Kelly essentially expressed a dedication to uphold the law, 
which is insufficient to justify disqualification under § 455.132  However, 
unlike Judge Kelly in Cooley, Judge Scheindlin did not discuss the merits 
of the Floyd case, nor did she state her opinion about the legality of the 
parties’ positions, as Judge Kelly did in his Nightline interview.133  In the 
interview, Judge Scheindlin made statements about her background and her 
past career as a federal judge, but did not weigh in on the validity of the 
plaintiffs’ claims against the NYPD.134  The statements discussing the 
merits of the Floyd case are instead attributed to Darius Charney, co-lead 
counsel for the plaintiffs.135 Furthermore, in the New York Law Journal 
piece mentioned in the Second Circuit’s ruling against Judge Scheindlin, 
the author made clear that Judge Scheindlin was not discussing the merits 
of the Floyd case.136 
Therefore, the articles written about Judge Scheindlin stand in stark 
contrast to two recent instances where judges’ media interactions have 
caused them to be disqualified because Judge Scheindlin does not discuss 
the merits of the claims by the Floyd parties in her interviews.137  For 
example, in United States v. Microsoft, a federal judge discussed with 
 131.  See, e.g., Cooley, 1 F.3d at 993-94 (illustrating that a judge expressing a 
dedication to uphold the law is insufficient to reasonably question that judge’s 
impartiality). 
 132.  See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d at 351 (instructing that a judge’s statement of a 
willingness to uphold the law is not a proper justification for finding that the judge 
lacked the requisite impartiality under § 455(a)). 
 133.  See Cooley, 1 F.3d at 995 (disqualifying a federal judge for appearing on 
television while a case was being litigated and stating that the defendant was breaking 
the law). 
 134.  See generally Toobin, Rights and Wrongs, supra note 65, at 1 (outlining Judge 
Scheindlin’s personal background, her legal career, and her time as a federal judge 
since 1994). 
 135.  See id. at 1-2 (discussing, with counsel for the plaintiffs, the statistics that the 
plaintiffs brought to argue that the NYPD’s policy violates their rights). 
 136.  See Hamblett, supra note 73 (establishing that the ongoing proceedings in 
Floyd were “off the table” in his interview with Judge Scheindlin).   
 137.  Compare Toobin, Rights and Wrongs, supra note 65, at 1-2 (interviewing a 
judge who appears openly in an online article to discuss her career while the comments 
about a high profile case are limited to the author and statements by the litigants) with 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 127, at 34-35 (describing cases where judges 
were disqualified for speaking about parties’ claims and met with hand-picked 
reporters to discuss cases). 
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secret reporters the merits of the underlying case.138  Likewise, in United 
States v. Cooley, the presiding judge spoke directly on the merits of the 
proceedings by stating, on television, that the protestors were breaking the 
law.139  By comparison, Judge Scheindlin did not speak on the merits of 
either case or give peculiarly “secret interviews” with “select reporters.”140  
As such, although judges are discouraged from appearing in the media 
while a case is being litigated, Judge Scheindlin’s conduct in speaking with 
the media and the content of those interviews is within the parameters set 
forth in Microsoft and Cooley.141 
Nichols and Floyd are analogous because they both deal with the 
impartiality of federal judges in highly publicized cases, and Nichols is 
especially instructive because it illustrates the factual circumstances that 
give rise to a questioning of impartiality under § 455 in such a high-profile 
case.142  The only statements on the merits of the claims in Floyd are by the 
author or the lawyers as quoted by the author, as are the characterizations 
of Judge Scheindlin, which the Nichols court made clear was not to be 
considered as indicative of the judge’s lack of impartiality.143  Therefore, 
the Second Circuit erred in finding the appearance of bias in Judge 
Scheindlin’s interviews with The New Yorker and The New York Law 
Journal because she did not speak about the merits of the case and the 
validity of the parties’ claims.144 
 138.  See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 127, at 34 (relying on the facts 
supporting disqualification in the Microsoft case, where the judge conducted interviews 
with select reporters and spoke on the merits of the actual case). 
 139.   See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that the 
trial judge stated on Nightline that the defendant abortion protestors were acting 
illegally and that his injunction against them was to be honored). 
 140.  Compare Toobin, Rights and Wrongs, supra note 65, at 1-2 (discussing Judge 
Scheindlin’s background and history as a federal judge), with FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, supra note 127, at 34-36 (illustrating the circumstances in Cooley and 
Microsoft, where judges spoke to the media discussing the parties’ claims). 
 141.  See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995) (instructing that a 
judge’s statements to the media are not indicative of partiality under § 455(a) as long as 
the judge does not personally speak as to the merits of the case or make 
characterizations about the claims of the parties). 
 142.  See id. at 349 (describing the media attention that the Oklahoma City bombing 
received and the publicized trials of bombers Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols); 
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (chronicling the 
NYPD’s controversial stop and frisk policy and the media attention that followed). 
 143.  See generally Toobin, Rights and Wrongs, supra note 65 (describing Judge 
Scheindlin’s judicial history with the NYPD as a “battle” and citing attorneys for the 
plaintiffs who discuss their claims about the NYPD’s stop and frisk policy). 
144.  See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 127, at 20 (highlighting the case 
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C. The Second Circuit Ruled Incorrectly in Finding that Judge Scheindlin’s 
Comments to the Plaintiffs in Daniels Weighed on her Impartiality Because 
the Extrajudicial Source Doctrine Precludes Their Consideration in a § 
455(a) Analysis. 
The extrajudicial source doctrine precludes a reviewing court from 
considering, for disqualifying purposes, a judge’s statements in court 
during the proceeding.145  This bar on “judicial sources” applies to prior 
proceedings, especially those involving the same defendant, as well as 
related cases.146  The NYPD is named as the defendant in each suit, and 
both Floyd and Daniels concern a racially based constitutional claim 
against the same entity.147  In that regard, both Floyd and Daniels concern 
constitutional violations by the NYPD.148  Floyd alleges that the NYPD 
violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights by 
conducting racially discriminatory and ineffective stop and frisks while 
Daniels involves a lack of probable cause arrest claim that the NYPD 
racially profiled the plaintiff.149  Therefore, the extrajudicial source doctrine 
should bar Judge Scheindlin’s in-court statements to the plaintiffs’ attorney 
in Daniels from bearing on her impartiality in Floyd, because the cases 
present related claims against the same defendant and do not warrant an 
extrajudicial source doctrine exception.150  Moreover, Judge Scheindlin 
instructed the plaintiffs during her colloquy in Daniels that they could mark 
their claim as “related” to Floyd, thereby acknowledging the link between 
law that emphasizes that judges cannot control everything that is written about them 
and are not per se biased for appearing in the media while a case is being litigated). 
 145.  See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994) (ruling that opinions 
held by judges as a result of what they learned in earlier proceedings are not to be 
characterized as “bias” or “prejudice.”). 
 146.  See id. (establishing that it is “normal and proper” for a judge to sit in 
successive trials regarding the same defendant and that these proceedings are not 
extrajudicial sources). 
 147.   See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 137 (2d Cir. 2013) (advising 
the plaintiff in Daniels that he could mark his case as a related case, given the nature of 
its claims). 
 148.  See Daniels v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 0809, 2003 WL 22510379, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2003) (describing the suit as a pro se false arrest claim against an 
NYPD officer for a lack of probable cause). 
 149.   See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(presenting a constitutional claim against the NYPD for illegal search and seizures 
under the City’s stop and frisk policy). 
 150.  See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 127, at 20 (noting that under the 
extrajudicial source doctrine a judge’s statements during proceedings do not influence 
her impartiality). 
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the two cases.151 
1. Judge Scheindlin’s Colloquy in Daniels Should Not Have Been
Considered Because it Does Not Fit into an Exception to the Extrajudicial 
Source Doctrine. 
Although the extrajudicial source doctrine precludes in-court statements 
by the judge from consideration under § 455(a), there are exceptions, in 
rare circumstances, where the judge’s favoritism would make fair judgment 
impossible.152  However, Judge Scheindlin’s comments to the plaintiffs in 
Daniels are more akin to the permissible prediction of guilt in United States 
v. Young, and less like the exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine
granted in the judge’s impermissible statement of his goals in United States 
v. Antar.153  In Daniels, Judge Scheindlin told the plaintiffs that they had a
good constitutional case.154  This is essentially weighing in on the merits of 
a party’s case, which is permissible in court under the extrajudicial source 
doctrine because in court predictions about the outcome of a case do not 
raise the appearance of bias.155  In Young, the judge stated that the 
defendant would “obviously” be convicted, and the Tenth Circuit 
concluded that this statement did not trigger an exception to the 
extrajudicial source doctrine because the prediction gave no indication that 
the judge would lack impartiality in ruling on evidence or instructing the 
jury should the case go to trial.156  In other words, the statement by the 
 151.  Compare Daniels, at *1 (presenting a racial-profiling claim against the NYPD 
for an unfounded arrest) with Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 578 (challenging, based upon 
racial inequities, the NYPD’s use of stop and frisks in making unwarranted stops of 
minorities). 
 152.  See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 541 (1994) (recognizing that, 
despite the general presumption that in-court statements will not be considered, there is 
an allowance for exceptions where the judge displays extreme favoritism). 
 153.  Compare United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405, 1415 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(refusing to grant recusal when a judge stated in court pre-trial that the defendant will 
“obviously” be convicted) with United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(granting recusal under an exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine because the 
judge stated that his goal from the start was to give back to the public what the 
defendant fraudulently took). 
 154.  See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 135-38 (2d Cir. 
2013)(instructing the plaintiffs that they have a strong claim against the NYPD for 
violating its own anti-racial profiling policy). 
 155.  See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 542 (instructing that the appearance of partiality cannot 
stem from the current proceedings). 
 156.  See Young, 45 F.3d at 1414-15 (describing the colloquy between the trial judge 
and defense counsel, where the judge tells counsel that “the preview of the coming 
attractions” entails his client being convicted and going to county jail). 
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judge in Young was not prejudicial, or enough of a showing of favoritism, 
to allow the reviewing court to consider the in-court statement in a § 455(a) 
analysis.157  Judge Scheindlin’s colloquy with the plaintiffs discussed the 
prospect of filing a later case, and is less prejudicial than the prediction of 
guilt before trial from Young, because Judge Scheindlin’s statement 
concerned merely the filing of a later case while the judge’s statement in 
Young concerned the defendant’s guilt or innocence in an ongoing case.158 
Therefore, at most, Judge Scheindlin’s comments are on par with the 
statements in Young, and they do not rise to the level of Antar, which called 
for an exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine.159  In Antar, the 
judge’s statement that his goal was to give back to the public what the 
defendant took evinces a bias that existed before the current case, whereas 
the extrajudicial source doctrine contemplates biases that are created and 
espoused during the current trial.160  Therefore, the judge in Antar showed 
his bias before the merits of the actual case were presented to him whereas 
Judge Scheindlin spoke on the validity of the plaintiff’s claim as it was 
presented to her throughout the colloquy and earlier proceedings.161  The 
judge in Antar evinced such a high degree of antagonism to the defendant, 
and in fact stated that his goal at trial was something other than what it 
should have been, while Judge Scheindlin did not show an improper goal—
or any goal—as she spoke on the validity of the plaintiff’s claims.162  
Therefore, because Judge Scheindlin’s statements to the plaintiffs do not 
evince an improper goal as in Antar, and instead speak to the validity of a 
parties’ claim as in Young, the Second Circuit should not have considered 
 157.  See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 542 (demonstrating that in-court statements and actions 
of a judge can only be considered in the rarest circumstances where there is evidence of 
deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that precludes a fair judgment). 
 158.  Compare Young, 45 F.3d at 1414 (excluding the consideration of a statement 
by the judge of the defendant’s obvious guilt), with In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 
F.3d at 121 (considering a judge’s statements to a plaintiff on the merits of his case 
before a claim has been filed). 
 159.  See United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir 1995) (finding an 
exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine as the judge’s statement of his goal to 
give back to the public made a fair judgment appear impossible). 
 160.  See id. at 576 (illustrating how the judge’s statements of giving back to the 
public at the outset of the case evince an appearance of bias that may have existed prior 
to the current proceeding). 
 161.  See id. at 578 (noting that the when a judge forms his opinions in a separate 
civil case, he must be careful to not have those opinions spill over to his goal in a 
criminal case). 
 162.  See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 138 (speaking in court on the 
chance of success of the plaintiffs prospective claims against the NYPD). 
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the colloquy due to the extrajudicial source doctrine.163 
2. Judge Scheindlin’s History of Jurisprudence, though Mentioned in an
Extrajudicial Source, Should Not Weigh on her Impartiality Because it 
Concerns In Court Statements and Actions that are Protected by the 
Extrajudicial Source Doctrine. 
Judges cannot control everything that is written about them.164  
Consequently, Judge Scheindlin’s history of jurisprudence mentioned in 
The New Yorker and the New York Law Journal articles should not have 
been considered because prior adverse rulings are not to be considered in a 
§ 455(a) analysis.165 Nichols and the extrajudicial source doctrine make
clear that prior adverse rulings do not weigh on a judge’s impartiality under 
§ 455(a).166  Additionally, the New York County Lawyers Association
criticized the mayoral report as incomplete and based on a small sample 
size.167  To consider it would then require a reviewing court to engage in 
speculation that the Nichols court barred from § 455 analysis.168  Therefore, 
Judge Scheindlin’s previous rulings mentioned in the article should not be 
considered because they are prior adverse rulings barred by the 
extrajudicial source doctrine.169  Additionally, even if the previous ruling 
study was relevant, its small size render it inadequately supported to be 
more than impermissible speculation.170 
 163.  See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 127, at 22 (finding that circuit 
courts have followed Liteky’s analysis in generally denying consideration of judicial 
statements under a § 455(a) analysis).   
 164.  See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that judges are 
not responsible for reporters’ and authors’ opinions about them under a § 455(a) 
analysis). 
 165.  See generally Toobin, Rights and Wrongs, supra note 65 (alluding to a study 
conducted by the New York City Mayor’s Office that found that Judge Scheindlin 
suppressed more evidence as fruits of illegal searches than any of her colleagues).  
 166.  See Nichols, 71 F.3d at 351 (articulating that prior adverse rulings do not 
justify a finding of partiality under § 455(a)). 
 167.  See Neumeister, supra note 71 (mentioning the New York County Lawyers 
Association’s dismissal of the report by the Mayor’s office as based on too small a 
sample size). 
 168.  See Nichols, 71 F.3d at 351 (precluding “rumor and speculation” from a 
finding of bias or the appearance of impartiality under a § 455(a) analysis). 
 169.  See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (noting that, per the 
extrajudicial source doctrine, in court statements and prior adverse rulings are not 
grounds for disqualification).   
 170.  See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119,  1122 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(illustrating that § 455(a) recusal does not call for a reviewing court to engage in 
speculation). 
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In the circuit decisions refusing to grant recusal motions based on 
statements made during the current trial, the judge had made comments 
critical to the criminal defendant.171  For instance, in Young the judge stated 
pre-trial that the defendant would obviously be convicted.172  In Judge 
Scheindlin’s case, her comments and previous rulings appear to favor the 
criminal defendant in that she grants motions to suppress more frequently 
than her colleagues and described herself as skeptical of law enforcement; 
likewise, they should be equally barred from consideration under the 
extrajudicial source doctrine.173  Stating the she is skeptical of law 
enforcement is akin to a statement of upholding the law, and does not speak 
on the merits of any one case that the judge is hearing.174  Judge 
Scheindlin’s in court statements or rulings for the defendant are analogous 
to the judge in Young’s in court statements for the government, in that they 
express a willingness to uphold the law, and are thus insufficient to find the 
appearance of bias.175  Similarly, Judge Scheindlin’s statements are 
distinguishable from the Antar judge’s statements against the criminal 
defendant because she never stated an improper pretrial goal such as giving 
back what the NYPD took to the public.176  Therefore, Judge Scheindlin’s 
comments to the plaintiffs in Daniels and her previous adverse rulings 
against the NYPD should not have been considered to weigh on her 
impartiality under § 455(a).177  Reviewing the Second Circuit’s 
disqualification of Judge Scheindlin highlights certain instances where the 
 171.  See, e.g., United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405, 1414 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding 
no appearance of bias where a federal judge stated prior to trial that the “obvious” 
outcome was that the criminal defendant would be convicted). 
 172.   See id. (describing the judge’s guilty plea colloquy with the defendant where 
the judge predicted that “the coming attractions” would see the defendant convicted). 
 173.  See Neumeister, supra note 71 (referring to a Bloomberg administration study 
that found that sixty percent of Judge Scheindlin’s fifteen written “search-and-seizure” 
rulings since she took the bench in 1994 had gone against law enforcement).   
 174.  See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir. 1993) (establishing 
that media interviews alone do not raise the appearance of bias, except where a judge 
discusses the merits of the parties’ positions in an ongoing case).  
 175.   See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F. 3d  347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995) (listing prior adverse 
rulings and a willingness to uphold the law—in court or out of court—as insufficient to 
disqualify under § 455(a)). 
 176.  See United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 576 (3d Cir. 1995) (ordering 
disqualification where a judge stated that his goal from the outset was to give back to 
the public what the defendant took because the judge’s statement evinced such a high 
degree of favoritism that fair ruling would be impossible). 
 177.  See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (affirming the general 
bar on extrajudicial statements in consideration of a federal judge’s impartiality).   
28
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol23/iss1/6
2014] JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY 225 
court erred.178  First, the Second Circuit misapplied the § 455(a) standard 
for disqualification by not acknowledging that a § 455(a) reasonable person 
is one with knowledge of the underlying facts and law.179  Additionally, the 
Second Circuit erred in finding that the media interviews with Judge 
Scheindlin showed the appearance of bias, because the characterizations of 
the judge’s leanings were made by the author and the statements about the 
merits of the Floyd case were attributed by to lawyers involved with the 
case.180 Finally, the court misapplied the extrajudicial source doctrine in 
considering Judge Scheindlin’s statements to the plaintiffs in Daniels 
without providing a justification for the extreme circumstances that warrant 
an extrajudicial source doctrine exception.181 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Different circuit courts have applied different understandings of § 
455(a).182  Section 455(a) provides for a fact-specific analysis, but the 
statute does not give guidance on what type of factual scenarios lead to an 
appearance of bias.183  Subsection (a) consists of one sentence, and unlike 
subsection (b), it does not specifically outline scenarios that give rise to a 
finding of partiality.184  The vagueness of § 455(a) is evident in the 
 178.  See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 2013) (analyzing 
Judge Scheindlin’s conduct from the perspective of a reasonable observer as a opposed 
to a well-informed reasonable person with knowledge of the facts and law). 
 179.  See Nichols, 71 F.3d at 351 (10th Cir. 1995) (instructing that, for § 455(a) 
purposes, judges are not responsible for reporters’ personal opinions about them or 
characterizations of the judge in the media). 
 180.  See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
media interviews alone do not raise the appearance of bias, provided the judge does not 
discuss the merits of a case over which he or she is presiding). 
 181.  See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (affirming the extrajudicial source doctrine’s 
presumption that in court statements do not weigh on a judge’s impartiality except in 
circumstances where fair judgment would be impossible). 
 182.  Compare In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 129 (applying a reasonable 
person standard that does not mention the underlying knowledge of the facts) with 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (analyzing 
conduct from the perspective of a reasonable person with knowledge of the underlying 
facts and law). 
 183.  See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a) (2012) (providing a one sentence review standard 
whereby a federal judge should be disqualified if his or her impartiality could 
reasonably be questioned). 
 184.  See id. at § 455(b) (providing that, in addition the test from subsection (a), a 
federal judge shall also disqualify himself or herself where the judge has served as a 
lawyer in the controversy, has a financial or fiduciary interest in the matter, or he or she 
has served as a witness in the case). 
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divergent outcomes and applications of the statute, its standard, its 
conception of reasonableness, and what the statute calls a reviewing court 
to consider.185 
A. The § 455(a) Standard is Too Vague Because it has Resulted in Different 
Applications Across the Federal Circuits, as Seen in the Outcomes of Perry 
and Floyd. 
Both the Northern District of California in Perry and the Second Circuit 
in Floyd considered a trial judge’s impartiality under § 455(a); however, 
they applied different interpretations of the statute that resulted in different 
outcomes for the respective trial judges.186  § 455(a) governs the conduct of 
federal judges, meaning it covers judges in the Northern District of 
California and the Second Circuit alike and it should thus be uniformly 
applied.187  However, in Perry, the Northern District of California applied 
the reasonableness language from the statute to mean an informed, 
thoughtful person with knowledge of the facts and the law.188  On the other 
hand, in Floyd, the Second Circuit only considered Judge Scheindlin’s bias 
from the perspective of a “reasonable observer” without mention of the 
knowledge and informed requirements mentioned by the Perry court.189 
The vagueness of the statute results in different applications of the 
recusal standard across different federal circuits, with the Ninth Circuit 
applying a higher standard for recusal, and the Second Circuit applying a 
lower standard for disqualification.190  The § 455 standard originates from 
Canon 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Ninth Circuit’s 
 185.  See, e.g., In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 129 (finding that recusal 
was required based partially on judicial sources, despite the extrajudicial source 
doctrine’s limitation on consideration of in court statements by a federal judge). 
 186.  Compare id. (applying § 455(a) and finding the appearance of impartiality, 
thereby disqualifying Judge Scheindlin), with Perry, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 
(analyzing a judge’s conduct under § 455(a) and finding no appearance of bias). 
 187.  See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 127, at 1 (illustrating that, while § 
144 aims at actual bias, § 455 governs the appearance of bias for federal judges).   
 188.  See Perry, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1128-29 (noting that, under Ninth Circuit case 
law, the reasonable person envisioned by § 455(a) is thoughtful and informed on the 
underlying facts at law of the case when viewing a judge’s impartiality). 
 189.  See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 127 (examining Judge 
Scheindlin’s comments to the plaintiffs in Daniels from the perspective of a reasonable 
observer, and finding that these statements give rise to the appearance of bias). 
 190.  See Brian P. Leitch, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts:  A 
Proposal to Conform Statutory Provisions to Underlying Policies, 67 IOWA L. REV. 
525, 536 (1982) (illustrating the differing interpretations of § 455 across the federal 
circuits, focusing specifically on the Ninth, Fifth, and Third Circuits). 
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application of § 455 has retained part of the bias in fact, as opposed to 
appearance, requirements.191  This tension between bias in fact and bias in 
appearance has since been resolved mainly in favor of the appearance 
standard as evidenced by the Second Circuit.192  However, the ambiguity in 
the progress of the interpretation of § 455, even in the Second Circuit, is 
still present, as seen by the mention of Judicial Canon 3C in its first opinion 
about Judge Scheindlin.193  This mention of Canon 3C and its bias in fact 
finding was later limited to § 455(a) by the Second Circuit in its second 
opinion on November 13, but the ambiguous requirements of § 455 show 
through in this discrepancy.194  Therefore, the applications of § 455 in 
recent years have seen inconsistent applications across, and even within, 
the Courts of Appeals.195  This ambiguity, and the inconsistent application 
of § 455, must be cured so that federal judges and reviewing courts have 
clear guidelines as to what conduct warrants disqualification.196 
B. Section 455(b) Provides a Separate Test and Provides More Factual 
Guidelines for Reviewing Courts That, If Similar Guidelines were Included 
in Subsection (a), May Cure its Ambiguity. 
In contrast to the one-sentence standard provided by subsection (a), 
subsection (b) provides an additional test for partiality that includes a 
number of fact-specific guidelines to aid reviewing courts.197  The 
inconsistency in the application of (a) could be remedied by providing 
more guidelines as to factual determinations of the appearance of bias that 
 191.  See id. (describing the influence that Judicial Code Canon 3C has on the bias 
in fact interpretation of § 455 in the Ninth Circuit). 
 192.  See id. at 535-37 (chronicling the general shift in interpretation of § 455 from 
requiring a finding bias-in-fact to one of merely requiring the a finding of the 
appearance of bias in the federal circuit courts). 
 193.  See Ligon v. City of New York, 538 F. App’x 101 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding that 
Judge Scheindlin’s conduct during the Floyd litigation caused her to “run afoul” of 
Canon 3C(1) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges). 
 194.  See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 129 (qualifying the panel’s 
earlier ruling and stating that it found no actual bias or code of conduct violations but 
reiterating that Judge Scheindlin’s impartiality could still be reasonably questioned 
under § 455(a)). 
 195.  Compare Ligon, 538 F. Appx. at 101 (finding bias-in-fact under § 455 and 
under Canon 3C) with In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F. 3d at 129 (finding no actual 
bias under § 455 for the same judge under the same circumstances).   
 196.   See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)-(b) (providing several tests, both objective and 
subjective, for the disqualification or self-recusal of federal judges). 
 197.   See, e.g., § 455(b)(1) (calling for a judge to disqualify himself where he or she 
has personal bias or prejudice toward a party or personal knowledge of the disputed 
facts of that may be introduced as evidence in the proceeding). 
31
Kavanagh: Judicial Impartiality in Recent Civil Rights Victories: An Analys
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014
228 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 23.1 
has been explored in the § 455(a) case law.198  Where subsection (b)(4) 
discusses the improper financial stake that supports a finding of the 
appearance of bias, subsection (a) could add a provision that discusses the 
extrajudicial source doctrine and its very narrow exceptions.199  Likewise, 
where subsection (b)(2) discusses a judge’s prior work as a lawyer on the 
matter, an addition to subsection (a) could explain the extent—or lack 
thereof—that judges can discuss an ongoing proceeding in the media.200  
Subsection (a) is not necessarily inferior to subsection (b) due to its brevity, 
however its inconsistent application in the Perry and Floyd cases, and its 
history of confusion among the federal circuits, illustrates that the statute 
may need to be revised and expanded.201 
IV. CONCLUSION
§ 455(a) governs the impartiality of federal judges, and calls for
disqualification where a judge’s impartiality may reasonably be 
questioned.202  The Second Circuit misapplied this statute in its 
disqualification of Judge Scheindlin because it failed to consider that a 
reasonable person is one who is informed in the facts and law, it 
improperly concluded that Judge Scheindlin’s media interviews during the 
proceedings gave the appearance of bias, and it erroneously considered in-
court statements that Judge Scheindlin made to the plaintiffs in Daniels.203  
A comparison of the Second Circuit’s ruling against Judge Scheindlin with 
the Northern District of California’s ruling for Judge Walker illustrates the 
ambiguity surrounding § 455(a), an ambiguity that may be cured by adding 
additional factual guidelines as in § 455(b).204 
 198.  See, e.g., Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing seven 
unique factual circumstances—from judge’s prior opinions, public statements, 
colloquies with the parties—and how those circumstances reflect judicial impartiality 
under § 455(a)). 
 199.  See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (ruling that in court 
statements by a judge are not part of the § 455 analysis, except in rare circumstances 
showing extreme favoritism). 
 200.  See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir. 1993) (disqualifying a 
judge who appeared on television and stated that one of the parties in a current case he 
was hearing was clearly breaking the law). 
 201.  See Leitch, supra note 190, at 535-36 (discussing the varying interpretations of 
the standard provided by § 455 across the federal circuits). 
202.  See id. at 526 (outlining the purpose of § 455 since its inception in 1974). 
 203.  See e.g., In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(analyzing Judge Scheindlin’s colloquy with the plaintiffs in Daniels from the 
perspective of a reasonable “observer”). 
204.  See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1)-(5) (providing various additional guidelines to 
32
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol23/iss1/6
2014] JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY 229 
analyze a federal judge’s duty to recuse himself for bias or prejudice). 
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